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Abstract
We suggest to combine the Anthropic Principle with the Many-
Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Theory. Realizing the multiplicity
of worlds it provides an opportunity of explanation of some important
events which are assumed to be extremely improbable. The Mesoscopic
Anthropic Principle suggested here is aimed to explain appearance of
such events which are necessary for emergence of Life and Mind. It
is complementary to the Cosmological Anthropic Principle explaining
the fine tuning of fundamental constants. We briefly discuss various
possible applications of the Mesoscopic Anthropic Principle including
the Solar Eclipses and assembling of complex molecules. Besides, we
address the problem of Time’s Arrow in the framework of the Many-
Worlds Interpretation. We suggest the recipe for disentangling of quan-
tities defined by fundamental physical laws and by an anthropic selec-
tion. The main emphasis is made on the problem of the biological
evolution.
Key Words: many-worlds interpretation; mesoscopic anthropic principle;
biological evolution
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1 Introduction
Since the days of its creation the problems of interpretation of quantum
mechanics have been attracting attention of persons working in this field as
well as of a more broad public, including philosophers, psychologists, biol-
ogists and even of people of art and literature (Jammer, 1974). The main
feature of quantum mechanics, which distinguishes it from classical Newton
mechanics is the fact, that even if one has a complete knowledge of a state
of a system under consideration and would like to make a certain experi-
ment, more that one alternative result of such an experiment is possible.
The knowledge of the state of the system can permit us only to calculate
the probabilities of different outcomes of the experiment, as was first un-
derstood by Max Born (1926). However, a natural question arises: how can
we see only one outcome of an experiment and what happens with all other
alternatives ?
The first attempt to answer this question was undertaken in the frame-
work of the so called Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics,
which represents a collection of views and ideas of some of the founders of
quantum mechanics. Especially important, at least from our point of view,
were the contributions of Bohr, Heisenberg, Born and von Neumann, sum-
marized in fundamental books (Bohr, 1958; Heisenberg, 1958, Born, 1955;
von Neumann, 1955).
The mentioned above scientists emphasized different aspects of quantum
theory and, correspondingly elaborated different features of the Copenhagen
interpretation. Niels Bohr have suggested the notion of complementarity be-
tween different notions and approaches, which seemed to resolve apparent
contradictions of the quantum theory. Besides, he insisted on the existence
of the so called classical realm, where all the results of experiments and ob-
servations were registrated. Thus, the classical physics was considered not
only as a limiting case of the quantum physics, but also as a pre-requisit of its
very existence. Starting from his indeterminacy principle (Heisenberg, 1927)
Heisenberg stated that the observable properties of microobjects arised due
to the experiments and it is senseless to speak about their independent exis-
tence. Max Born insisted on the probablistic character of quantum theory.
Finally, it was von Neumann, who formulated the mathematically rigor-
ous idea of the reduction of the wave packet and in such a way had given a
constructive picture of events, occuring in the process of quantum measure-
ment. According to von Neumann, in the quantum mechanics coexisted two
processes. One of them is a unitary deterministic evolution of the wave func-
tion, describing the quantum system, according to the Schro¨dinger equation.
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The second process takes place during quantum measurement and is called
the reduction of the wave function, when one of the possible outcomes is
realized, while others disappear into thin air. In the process of quantum
measurement three players participate: an object, a measuring device and
an observer, and the presence of the latter two corresponds in a way to the
Bohr’s classical realm. Thus, in this picture, everything which one calculates
and predicts in quantum theory finds its explanation.
We would say, that the Copenhagen interpretation has played a very im-
portant role in the development of quantum mechanics and its applications.
Perhaps, it did not teach the researchers how they should calculate the ob-
servable quantities, but it rather explained why these calculations can have
some logical sense. Besides, it made the imagination of physicists more free
and have made them more accustomed to the idea that the deterministic
ideal of classical mechanics is not an absolute goal of the physical theory.
However, some of the other founders of quantum theory such as Planck,
Einstein, Schro¨dinger and de Broglie were not happy with the Copenhagen
interpretation and thought that some rebirth of the classical ideal was nec-
essary. The most consistent attempt of such a rebirth was undertaken by D.
Bohm and is known as de Broglie-Bohm interpretation (Bohm and Hilley,
1993).
On the other hand, the presence of two dynamical processes in the quan-
tum theory looked logically unsatisfactory not only for researchers which
could not leave aside the ideas of the classical determinism and it was here
where the new epistemiological revolution was riping. In 1957 a young re-
searcher Hugh Everett has published a short version of his PhD thesis in the
Reviews of Modern Physics (Everett, 1957). This paper had a rather mod-
est title “Relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics” and contained
a simple idea. We do not need the postulate of the reduction of the wave
packet and hence, only one fundamental process exists in the quantum the-
ory – the unitary evolution governed by the Schro¨dinger equation. All the
outcomes of the experiment co-exist and the objective result of the measure-
ment under consideration is the establishment of correlations between the
measured and measuring subsystems, which are treated on equal footing.
Thus, there is no need in the special classical realm too.
The Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics seemed to be quite
logical and economical, however, this economy was achieved by means of
the acception of parallel existence of different outcomes of a quantum mea-
surement and this was a critical point. Indeed, behind an innoncent mask
of the relative states of two or more subsystems loomed a disturbing image
of the co-existence of parallel worlds and of the splitting reality. Probably
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this fact explains rather a troubled history of entering of the Everett inter-
pretation into the scientific community (Byrne, 2010). It is interesting that
B. DeWitt was the referee of the paper in Reviews of Modern Physics and it
took some time to him to accept its publication. Thirteen years later he has
published the paper in Physics Today (DeWitt, 1970) and has edited a book
(DeWitt and Graham, 1973), which have given a new birth to the Everett
interpretation of quantum mechanics. Moreover, the name “many-worlds”
interpretation was also coined by DeWitt.
For many years the many-worlds interpretation (MWI) of quantum me-
chanics was considered as something rather exotical by people working in
quantum theory and its applications. However, now the situation is chang-
ing due to two main developments in quantum physics: progress in the study
of quantum cosmology (see e.g. the book (Vilenkin, 2006)) and the birth
of quantum informatics (Nielsen and Chuang, 2010). The quantum cosmol-
ogy is a branch of the theoretical physics, which treats the universe as a
unique quantum object. Thus, here there is no place for a classical realm,
an external observer and other agents, which could be responsible for the
presumed reduction of the wave function. Therefore, growing interest to this
field of research has aumented the interest to the Everett interpretation. On
the other hand the quantum computational algorithms consider the parallel
processes in a quantum system as a source of the drastic acceleration of
the computing. Thus, in some sense, the existence, at least on small scale,
of “parallel” realities becomes a “practical” tool of quantum computational
algorithms.
Now, when both the researchers and the broad public become accus-
tomed to notions of the many-worlds interpretation, one can note that, in
general, the idea of existence of parallel realities is not so alien to a human
intuition. It is enough to say that a lot of literature works, using directly the
ideas of the many-worlds interpretation, have been created. We shall cite
here only the book of science fiction with a smashing title “The Coming of
the Quantum Cats” by Frederic Pohl (1986). However, it is more interesting
that the idea of a real co-existence of different alternatives was expressed
in literature without any connection with quantum mechanics and long be-
fore the creation of the many-worlds interpretation. A reader, opening the
collection of articles, edited by DeWitt and Graham (1973) finds there as
an epigraph the citation from a story, written by Jorge Luis Borges, “The
Garden of Forking Paths”, written in 1941 (Borges, 1941). Much less known
is a story, written by another Argentian writer, a friend of Borges, Adolfo
Bioy Casares, which is called “The Celestial Plot”, written even earlier in
1940 (Bioy Casares, 1940). The main character of this story travels between
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parallel universes with the different histories, and these parallel universes
look very much as Everett worlds.
As far as we know, almost nobody has done a juxtaposition of the many-
worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics with a story, written in 1927
by a Russian Soviet writer Ryurik Ivnev “An old man from Vladivistok”
(Ivnev, 1927). We shall permit ourselves to translate a couple of pieces
from this story, used as epigraphs in the book by Barvinsky, Kamenshchik
and Ponomariov (1988)). “ The road, chosen by us, will be our main one,
however, from here does not follow that other roads do not exist ? They
are real as well as that, chosen by us, and any of these roads would be our
main road, if we had taken it.” “What will give you my “theory”, if it
can be called in that way ? Now it gives you nothing. But in the future,
provided you have a curious intelligence, it would give you some pleasure.
This pleasure consists in your feeling, that in your travel bag lay huge, and
still not used, storages of the movies of your life.”
We have given these examples to argue that the main revolutionary idea
of the many-words interpretation is not so counter-intuitive and is quite
compatible if not with a common sense, but at least with a general human
fantasy.
Now, let us turn to the second topic of our paper. The anthropic prin-
ciple (AP) was proposed long ago (Dirac, 1937; Dirac, 1938; Dicke, 1961;
Carter, 1970; Rosental, 1980; Rosental, 1988; Rosental, 1997; Barrow and
Tipler, 1988), but recently it got a strong boost (Rubakov, 2006; Wein-
berg, 2005), connected with the development of cosmology (Garriga, Linde
and Vilenkin, 2004; Pogosian, Vilenkin and Tegmark, 2006; Garriga et al.,
2006) and string theory (Susskind, 2003). The general idea of AP consists
in the statement that existence of the (human) observer imposes important
restrictions on the basic laws and fundamental physical constants. As soon
as these restrictions happen to be of tantamaunt importance, the required
values of physical constants appear to be extremely improbable. This small-
ness of probability could be compensated by the huge number of universes
constituting Multiverse. Under this term one should understand a compli-
cated object which may be formed by the process of the ramification of the
spatial structure of the universe due to the effects of spontaneous symmetry
breaking producing inflationary expansion of the patches of spacetime. Such
an opportunity is inherent in the chaotic inflation models (Linde, 1990).
Another source of multiversity is the existence of the so called string
landscape which means that the fundamental superstring theory contains
a huge amount of vacuum states, each of those may lead to quite different
universes with different physics.
5
Here we would like to elaborate our earlier suggestion (Kamenshchik and
Teryaev, 2008) of MWI as another source of multiplicity opening the possi-
bility of further extension of applicability of AP. As soon as this multiplicity
does not lead to the change of fundamental constants (although there are
suggestions (Panov, 2011) to that the very early branchings may lead to the
variations of these constants) we are dealing with what we called ”Meso-
scopic” AP, corresponding to the scales intermediate between cosmological
and microscopic ones. Let us emphasize that while the multiplicity coming
from the string theory or from the inflationary cosmology is something still
hypothetical, the multiplicity of the alternatives, which is present already
in quantum theory even for a relatively simple systems is something quite
real. It is already here, and to recognize that it is so, it is enough to take the
many-worlds interpretation of quantum theory seriosly. We have made an
attempt to do it in the mentioned paper (Kamenshchik and Teryaev, 2008).
Here we develop and extend our presentation.
The structure of the paper is the following: the second section is de-
voted to a brief review of the basic ideas of the many-worlds interpretation
of quantum mechanics; in the third section we discuss branching of worlds
understood in the sense of the defactorization of the wave function and the
problem of the preferred basis; in the fourth section we consider the impor-
tant problem of irreversibility and appearance of the arrow of time in terms
of the many-worlds interpretation; the fifth section deals with the defini-
tion of the Mesoscopic Anthropic Principle and its simplest applications to
planetary systems; in the sixth section we discuss the relation between the
Mesocscopic Anthropic Principle and the emergence of Life; in the seventh
section we treat the biological evolution in terms of variety of options pro-
vided by the quantum evolution; in the section eight we discuss possible
relations between the problem of conscience and quantum theory; in ninth
section we try to argue that events, which have small probabilities of realiza-
tion are no less important than those having large probablities; in the last
section we discuss the main results and suggest some criteria for disentan-
gling of quantities defined by fundamental physical laws and by an anthropic
selection.
2 Many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics
As we have already mentioned, the many-worlds interpretation of quantum
mechanics was suggested by H. Everett in 1957 (Everett, 1957) and its in-
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vention was motivated by two factors. One of them was intensively discussed
since the moment of creation of quantum mechanics: it is the problem of
reconciliation between two processes present in the theory - dynamical evolu-
tion in accordance with the Schro¨dinger equation and the reduction of wave
packet, responsible for an observation of the unique outcome of quantum
measurement when the quantum state represents a superposition of the cor-
responding eigenstates. In the most popular Copenhagen interpretation of
quantum mechanics such a coexistence of these two processes was provided
by the separation of the so called classical realm, which in some versions was
connected even with the presence of a conscious observer. Thus the desire of
getting rid of the ambiguity connected with the wave packet reduction pos-
tulate and having a unique quantum description of the Nature stimulated
the creation of MWI. In the framework of MWI the Schro¨dinger evolution is
the only process, the principle of superposition is applicable to all the states
including macroscopic ones and all the outcomes of any measurement-like
processes are realized simultaneously but in different “parallel universes”.
The very essence of the many-worlds interpretation can be expressed by one
simple formula we are about to derive. Let us consider the wave function of
a system, containing two subsystems (say, an object and a device), whose
wave functions are respectively |Φ〉 and Ψ〉 and let us the process of the in-
teraction between these two subsystems is described by a unitary operator
Uˆ . The result of the action of this operator can be represented as
Uˆ |Φ〉0Ψ〉i = |Φ〉iΨ〉i. (1)
Here the state |Ψ〉i is a quantum state of the object corresponding to a
definite outcome of the experiment, while |Φ〉0 is an initial state of the
measuring device and |Φ〉i describes the state of the measuring device, which
has found the quantum object in the state |Ψ〉i. Now, let the initial state of
the object be described by a superposition of quantum states:
|Ψ〉 =
∑
i
ci|Ψ〉i. (2)
Than the superposition principle immediately leads to
Uˆ |Φ〉0Ψ〉 = Uˆ |Φ〉0
∑
i
ci|Ψ〉i =
∑
i
ci|Φ〉iΨ〉i. (3)
The superposition (3) contains more than one term, while one sees only one
outcome of measurement. The reduction of the wave packet postulate solves
this puzzle by introducing another process eliminating in a non-deterministic
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way all the terms in the right-hand side of Eq. (3) but one. The MWI instead
says that all the terms of the superposition are realized but in different
universes.
The MWI looks the most consistent between interpretations of quantum
theory, because it ultimately reduces the number of postulates. Moreover,
one of the proponents of MWI B.S. DeWitt says that in the framework of
it the mathematical formalism of the theory gives itself its interpretation
(DeWitt, 1970).
Now, let us turn to the second motivation for MWI. In quantum cos-
mology there is no external observer and hence, no, classical realm. Thus,
MWI matches quite well the quantum cosmology.
3 Branching of Worlds and the preferred basis
The opportunity to extract non-trivial physical consequences in the context
of MWI is based on the treating of the branching of worlds as an objective
process. However, inevitable question arises: decomposing the wave func-
tion of the universe one should choose a certain basis. The result of the
decomposition essentially depends on it. Thus, the so called problem of the
choice of the preferred basis arises ( Deutsch, 1985; Markov and Mukhanov,
1988; Dieks, 1989; Ben Dov, 1990; Albrecht, 1992). The essence of the prob-
lem can be easily formulated considering the same example of a quantum
system consisting of two subsystems. Let us emphasize that now we would
like to undertake a consideration of a general case without particular ref-
erence to artificial measuring devices and quantum objects (for a moment
we consider this division of a system into subsystems as granted). The only
essential characteristics of the branching process is the defactorization of the
wave function. That means that if at the initial moment the wave function
of the system under consideration was represented by the direct product of
the wave functions of the subsystems
|Ψ〉 = |φ〉|χ〉 (4)
then after an interaction between the subsystems it becomes
∑
i
ci|φ〉i|χ〉i, (5)
where more than one coefficient ci is differentt from zero. Apparently the
decomposition (5) can be done in various manners. As soon as each term is
8
associated with a separate universe, the unique prescription for the construc-
tion of such a superposition should be fixed. We believe that the correct
choice of the preferred basis is the so called Schmidt or bi-orthogonal basis.
This basis is formed by eigenvectors of both the density matrices of the sub-
systems of the quantum system under consideration. These density matrices
are defined as
ρˆI = TrII |Ψ〉〈Ψ|, (6)
ρˆII = TrI |Ψ〉〈Ψ|. (7)
Remarkably, the eigenvalues of the density matrices coincide and hence the
number of non-zero eigenvalues is the same, in spite of the fact that the
corresponding Hilbert spaces can be very different.
ρˆI |φn〉 = λn|φn〉, (8)
ρˆII |χn〉 = λn|χn〉, (9)
Consequently, the wave function is decomposed as
|Ψ〉 =
∑
α
√
λn|φn〉|χn〉. (10)
The bi-orthogonal basis was first used at the dawn of quantum me-
chanics by E. Schro¨dinger (1935,1936) for the study of correlations between
quantum systems and was applied to MWI in (Zeh, 1973; Barvinsky and
Kamenshchik, 1990; Barvinsky and Kamenshchik, 1995a). Recently, this
basis is actively used for measuring of degree of entanglement, in particular,
in relation to quantum computing (Shimony, 1995). The expansion with
respect to eigenvectors of spin density matrix and density matrix positivity
was also used in hadronic physics and non-perturbative QCD (Efremov and
Teryaev, 1982; Artru et al., 2009).
We believe that the bi-orthogonal basis being defined by the fixing of the
decomposition of the system into subsystems has a fundamental character
and determines the worlds which result from the defactorization process.
However, the subdivision of the system onto subsystems which implies the
branching of the worlds should satisfy some reasonable criteria which we are
not ready to formalize at the moment (see, however the paper (Barvinsky
and Kamenshchik, 1995b) for analysis of some relatively simple cases). One
can say, that the decomposition into the subsystems should be such that
the corresponding preferred basis were rather stable. For example, when
one treats a quantum mechanical expreriment of the Stern-Gerlach type, it
is natural to consider the measuring device and the atom as subsystems.
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At the end of this section we would like to say some words about the com-
parison between the many-worlds approach to the interpretation of quantum
mechanics and the decoherence approach. The decoherence approach to the
problem of quantum measurement and to the problem of relations between
quantum and classical properties of objects was proposed by Zeh in 1971
(Zeh, 1971). In the background of this approach lies an understanding of
the fact that in any process of quantum measurement there are not two,
but three participants: namely, not only the quantum object and measuring
device, but also the rest of the universe - the so called environment. After
the measurement, we can construct the reduced density matrix, describing
the object and device, tracing out unobservable degrees of freedom of the
environment. It appears that in many cases this reduced density matrix
becomes quickly practically diagonal in some good basis, whose states are
sometimes called “pointer states” (Zurek, 1981; Zurek, 1982) and behaves
more or less classically. In such a way, the quantum state of the object and of
the measuring device becomes a classical statistical mixture. The decoher-
ence approach has a lot of useful applications, ranging from the description
of properties of some molecules to quantum gravity and cosmology (see the
book (Giulini et al., 1996)). However, from our point of view the decoher-
ence approach to the problem of quantum measurement and to the problem
of classical - quantum relations is less fundamental than the many-worlds
approach.
First, there is an essential difference between statistical principles in
classical and quantum physics. In classical physics the probability is “the
measure of our ignorance” of the initial conditions or of the details of inter-
action while in quantum physics we cannot get rid of the probability even in
principle, where is no analogue to the “Laplace demon”, who can calculate
everything. Thus, the transition to a classical statistical mixture does not
resolve the problem of choice between different alternatives.
Second, the decoherence properties of reduced density matrix depend
crucially on the choice of the basis. Thus, the classicality is introduced into
the theory already at the level of the choice of the basis. In the bi-orthogonal
preferred basis approach, described above, the basis is defined by the chosen
decomposition of the system under consideration into subsystems. After
that, one can study the dynamics of different elements of the basis and to
see if they behave classically (Barvinsky and Kamenshchik, 1995a). It ap-
pears, that sometimes classicality exists as a stable phenomenon, sometimes
– as a temporary phenomenon and sometimes it does not exist at all. Thus,
the many-worlds interpretation, insisting on the primary role of the quan-
tum theory with respect to the classical one, describes a more wide class of
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phenomena. Nevertheless, for a large class of situations, the predictions of
both approaches are close. It happens when the bi-orthogonal basis is close
to the pointer basis.
4 Time‘s arrow
The formalism of the many-world interpretation of quantum theory per-
mits to reformulate the problem of a direction of time in a very transparent
way. Indeed, the basic dynamics equations are invariant with respect to
the operation of time reflection, while the macroscopic phenomena show the
irreversibility or the presence of the arrow of time. One of the quantita-
tive manifestations of these phenomena is the growth of the von Neumann
entropy (von Neumann, 1955)
S = −Tr(ρˆ ln ρˆ) = −
∑
i
λi lnλi ≡
∑
i
Si. (11)
where the last equality introduces, in the context of MWI the notion of
relative entropies of branches. This entropy is minimal and equal to zero
for a pure quantum state. Usually, the presence of the arrow of time is
connected with the existence of some additional constraints on the solutions
of fundamental equations. For example, choosing an initial state as a state
with a low value of entropy, one naturally sees its growth. We make an
observation that the branching process in the MWI naturally produces the
states with a smaller initial relative entropy (that is calculated by taking
into account only one branch). In other words, after the measurement-like
act of branching a new branch is in a factorized quantum state and the den-
sity matrices of all its subsystems correspond to pure quantum states. This
does not contradict to the increase of entropy in the standard (Copenhagen)
treatment of quantum measurement. In the latter case one is dealing after
the measurement with the classical statistical mixture of various outcomes
producing increase of entropy which can be measured experimentally. At
the same time in MWI the process of measurement (defactorization of the
wave function) naturally implies the increase of entropy, but after the iden-
tification of an outcome of the measurement, when the defactorization of
the wave function is completed, the relative entropy (related to the branch
where we live) becomes equal to Si. Forgeting about other branches, which
is equivalent to the reduction of the wave packet in the Copenhagen inter-
pretation, corresponds to rescaling λ → 1 and Si → S
R;SR(t0) = 0, where
SR is the redefined entropy after the branching happened at time t0. Thus,
11
relative entropy of each branch is always growing, SRi (t) > S
R
i (0) = 0, so is
Si and the usual measurable entropy of classical statistical mixture which
is just the sum (11) of the entropies of the branches. Note that this nulli-
fication of relative entropy does not involve the distant regions of Universe
which are the same for all the branches.
Thus, MWI provides another manifestation of the effect of boundary
conditions which is present in any explanation of irreversibility. The exam-
ple of such boundary conditions is, say, the correlations weakening in the
Bogoliubov-Born-Green-Kirkwood-Yvon chain of equations leading to the
appearance of irreversibility. In another approach, when deriving (Zaslavsky,
2002) the irreversible master equation from the reversible Kolmogorov-Chapman
equation it is sufficient (Teryaev, 2005) to assume the existence of the initial
conditions in the past. The role of boundary effects for the irreversibility of
field theory evolution equations implying the ”scale arrow” , analogous to
time’s arrow, is discussed in (Teryaev, 2005; Artru et al., 2009). In turn, the
irreversibility with respect to the time reflection in field theory may appear
either because of T (or CP) violation at the fundamental level or because
of its simulation by imaginary phases of scattering amplitudes. The lat-
ter crucially depend on the sign of iǫ in the Feynman propagators which is
imposed by the causal boundary conditions for Green functions. One may
consider this as a sort of spontaneous symmetry breaking of time-reversal
symmetry. This effect is giving rise to T-odd spin asymmetries (Efremov
and Teryaev, 1985; Teryaev, 2000) being the subject of intensive theoretical
and experimental studies.
In the actual case of MWI the choice of boundary conditions corresponds
to the choice of factorized wave function in the past, rather than in the
future. However, as MWI may be considered as ”self-interpretation” of the
mathematical formalism of quantum theory (DeWitt, 1970), the suggested
approach may explain the fundamental phenomenon of Arrrow of Time in
a similar manner.
To conclude this section we would like to comment the differences be-
tween the many-worlds approach to the problem of the irreversibility of time
and the approach, developed by Prigogine and his school (Prigogine, 1980).
The Brussel group suggested that the irreversibility should be introduced
into both the classical and quantum physics already on the fundamental
microscopic level. How can one achieve this goal in spite of the fact that the
corresponding dynamical equations are invariant with respect to the time
inversion ? The option of spontaneous breaking of T-invariance seems not
to be considered by Brussel school. It was suggested instead to introduce
an additional principle which prescribes the consideration of mixed states.
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In classical physics it means that one should consider some finite “spots”
in the phase space instead of the points (pure states). In quantum physics
it means that we should take into account only the states, whose density
matrix is such that ρ2 6= ρ. However, this requirement looks not so natural
in classical mechanics. Indeed, if we consider a system in a pure state all
its subsystems will be also in pure states. In quantum mechanics, it is quite
common to have a system in a pure state and its subsystems in mixed states.
Thus, the evolution of these subsystems generally is irreversible. In terms of
the many-worlds interpretation it means that the branching of the Everett
worlds is generally an irreversible process. Let us conclude this discussion
by mentioninng that MWI makes the spot, like any statistical ensemble, the
very natural physical notion.
5 Planetary Coincidences andMesoscopic Anthropic
Principle
It is usually believed that the suitable values of fundamental constants are
sufficient for emergence of stars, planetary systems and all the astrophysical
objects required for apperance of life. However, there are a number of obser-
vations pointing to the special, privileged, role of the Solar system (see e.g.
(Gonzalez and Richards, 2004)). All the values describing this privileged
position cannot involve the fine-tuning of neither constants of elementary
particle physics nor cosmology. Therefore we call such a coincidences the
mesoscopic anthropic coincidences and the related selection the Mesoscopic
Anthropic Principle (MAP).
Note that understanding of Earth exceptional properties developed rel-
atively recently and may be considered as a discovery of present Millenium.
The famous Polish thinker, philosopher and Science fiction writer, Stanislaw
Lem was writing (Lem, 2001) in an essay summarizing the outcomes of his
numerous predictions “Last time I was quite impressed by reading of the
solid American works published in 2000, discussing the extreme uniqueness
of our planet with its biosphere, and, indirectly but expressively the authors
convince us that all of us (together with fellow yeast) are the only living
creatures in all the galaxy called Milky Way”.
Note also, that the notion of MAP in its application to Earth specifics
is very close to “Planetary version” of AP suggested by R. Dawkins in his
bestseller (Dawkins, 2009)-pp.62-69, whose 1st edition, appeared in 2006,
unfortunately, was not known to us when the e-print version of (Kamen-
shchik and Teryaev, 2008) was released in 2007.
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The first natural opportunity to find the privileged values of planetary
characteristics is to explore the vast number of galaxies, stars, and planets in
our Universe (Muller, 2001; Dawkins, 2009). Note, that the necessity of this
large number provides a sort of answer for one line of possible criticism of
AP suggesting that the existence of such a large Universe is hardly necessary
for the life on the Earth, this argument being best expressed by S. Hawking
who was saying that “our Solar system is certainly a prerequisite for our
existence... But there does not seem any necessity for other galaxies to
exist” (Hawking, 1993).
At the same time, the selection among the large number of distant astro-
physical objects does not seem sufficient if some fine-tuned value of meso-
scopic parameter is required. For this aim the small changes of the relevant
parameter within the required range are important. This is exactly what
happens in the chaotic inflation or stringy landscape and allows for a fine
tuning of fundamental constants 1. At the same time, the emergence of
supportive values of the planetary characteristics due to small variations of
initial values of Universe evolutions seem unnatural due to the very large
time interval and likelihood of instabilities and chaos of the respective evo-
lution.
As a possible solution of this problem we suggest that the MWI is a
source of small variations of mesoscopic planetary constants in different
worlds occurring at various time scales. We assume that the measurement-
like quantum interactions leading to the branching occur all the time inde-
pendently of the presence of (conscious) observer and produce the planetary
systems in parallel Everett worlds whose parameters differ by small amount.
The example of planetary fine-tuning is provided by Solar eclipses re-
quiring the coincidences of angular sizes of Sun and Moon, as seen from the
Earth. There is currently no explanation of this coincidence, apart from
teleological arguments. At the same time, this coincidence would be ex-
plained if the eclipse were necessary for some stage of the emergence of life
( Teryaev,unpublished; Kamenshchik and Teryaev, 2008). This does not
seem completely impossible, although there is no evidences in favour of such
a relation. One possibility is the emergence of life due to photochemical
reaction requiring the shadowing of strong ultraviolet radiation of the Sun
but presence of the radiation of Solar Corona. Another possible role of the
Moon having the angular size similar to that of Sun can be due to tidal force
resonance (Vilenkin, 2010). Note also that the discrepancy of sizes due to a
1Such a small changes of some parameter constitute, in fact, the cornerstone of Dar-
winian natural selection, see also the next sections
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change of distance between Moon and Earth may be a signal that the Moon
played its role not so long ago.
6 Mesoscopic Anthropic Principle and Emergence
of Life
However, even a suitable planetary environment does not lead automatically
to the emergence of the primitive life. In fact, the probability of emergence
of the first DNA molecule to start the simplest replication cycle is about
10−400 (Chernavsky, 2009), while the number of attempts (realizing the
famous Darwin’s idea of “small warm pond”) is about 10−29. Let us note
that this order of magnitude difference in the argument of exponential will
persist in the popular model of RNA world.
This huge number may be compensated by a huge number of attempts in
the framework of MWI. The crudest estimate (Kamenshchik and Teryaev,
2008) of the number of the Everett worlds produced up to the present mo-
ment was based on the assumption that it is the Planck constant ~ which
selects the measurement-like interactions leading to defactorization. For
dimensional reasons when determining the number of worlds it should be
divided by some constant with the dimension of action or phase space, char-
acterizing the whole Universe. The relevance of the scale of the whole Uni-
verse can be seen from EPR measurement of two particles with arbitrarily
large separation between them. The emerging ratio is related to the ratio
of the Planck time tP and the age of the Universe T .
N = f
(
T
tP
)
, . (12)
where f is some growing function which should be close to exponential
(supported by the chain character of branching) which leads to N ∼ 1010
60
.
This number seems to be fairly huge in order to accommodate all the unlikely
events leading to the modern picture of Life, and there is no other reason at
sight for such number appearance.
Note that the relevance of the whole Universe for the life emergence
makes natural the role of its distant regions and life transmission by mete-
orites which is currently got a solid experimental support.
In fact, a similar opportunity (without these estimates) was explored
by J. McFadden (McFadden, 2001) in the case of the earliest stage of the
biological evolution, where he expresesed a revolutionary idea that the first
life appears only in one of the innumerous Everett worlds.
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However, the author dislikes the immediate consequences of his hypothe-
sis which he absolutely correctly deduces: namely, that extraterrestrial life,
and therefore, intelligence does not exist (note the same hypothesis was
suggested for different reasons by I.S. Shklovsky who radically changed his
earlier opinion (Shklovsky, 1968; Lem, 2001) and that the life cannot be
created in the laboratory.
To overcome these obstacles he suggests the another use of quantum
theory to explain the improbable event, namely, the inverse Zeno effect.
However, we did not consider this opportunity as a plausible one (Kamen-
shchik and Teryaev, 2008).
Indeed, he considers as a model of improbable event the passage of light
through the vertically and horizontally polarized lenses while the insertion
of extra lenses between them increases the probability.
This case, however, deals with low-dimensional system when the small
probability is achieved due to a sort of fine-tuning (mutual orthogonality of
lenses). At the same time, the low probability of a transition leading to a
first self-replicator is due to a large dimension of the corresponding Hilbert
space. More quantitatively, if one has two wave functions (normalized vec-
tors in a Hilbert space) one of which |i〉, corresponds to initial “single amino
acid arginine” (McFadden,2000) while, the second, |f〉, corresponds to the
emerged self-replicator. The typical (average) value of the square of their
scalar product (fidelity), related to a transition probability is
< |〈i|f〉|2 >=
1
N
, (13)
where N is a dimension of the Hilbert space defined by the number of par-
ticipating elements. Now, if one produces some quantum measurement, the
scale of this quantity clearly remains the same. The only way to increase
these probabilities by a dense series of measurements would be to arrange
them in some particular way defined by the initial and the final states. The
appearance of such a special measurement-like process is not easier to ex-
plain than the occurrence of a small-probability quantum transition. At the
same time, some random measurements will not substantially increase the
probability (13), contrary to the case of polarized lenses, when the specially
organized low probability may be increased by a generic measurement.
Therefore, we do not consider inverse quantum Zeno effect as a candidate
for the explanation of low probability events necessary for life emergence and
come back to the initial suggestion of McFadden about the use of MWI.
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7 Mesoscopic Anthropic Principle and Biological
Evolution
While for the emergence of life there is the common agreement among the
biologists that its current understanding is not satisfactory, it is not so
for further evolution leading to the appearance of its complex forms. The
Darwinian evolution is an adaptive one (Dawkins, 1996) and explains the
arising of the complex structures if they provide the evolutionary advantages.
At the same time, the appearance of complex structures, which does not
lead to immediate evolutionary success, including the Human beings is not
trivial to explain. The production of complexity in the process of the type
of random walk may be explained (Gould, 1996) only if this complexity is
relatively low. The random walk in that case is limited by zero complexity
barrier and produces its increase. The further evolutionary process explains
the progress of most numerous species, like insects, but not the appearance
of complex and rare ones.
To explore the possible role of MWI in the evolution, we suggest to ex-
tend this mechanism to all the stages of biological evolution. Indeed, the
original suggestion of McFadden (2001) is to limit the field of applicabil-
ity of quantum effects to the microbilogical scale (McFadden, 1999) when
the entanglement between cell and its environment is essential, while for
the multi-cell structures quantum effects were considered (McFadden, 2001)
unimportant.
Contrary to that, we suggest that all the mutations in the course of
biological evolution are the quantum measurent-like processes so that all
their different outcomes are realized in different branches. The increasing of
complexity now has a purely random character, so that only in few parallel
worlds the biological evolution produces more and more complex species.
All the parallel worlds emerging due to mutations differ only by small
variations in the mutating organism. This feature is common with a stan-
dard (neo)Darwinian paradygm. What is different from it is that all the
versions of this variation are realized in different parallel Everett worlds.
This naturally implies the increase of complexity in some of them just by
random process. In our opinion, this solves the fundamental problem of
the extremely law probability of life emergence and evolution to the most
complex forms, including ourselves.
There is a number of fundamental facts which, to our opinion, do not
contradict to or even support this hypothesis. These are “punctuated equi-
librium” (evolution proceeds by sudden bursts followed by long “stasis”
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periods), “Out of Africa” theory (Leakey, 1996) ( appearance of all humans
from a single family), “Mitochondrial Eve” (identifying a common female
anchestor, being the support of previous theory), “irreversibility of the brain
formation” (once emerged brain never reduced in the course of evolution)
etc.
Another phenomenon which is currently considered as an evidence of
a directed evolution (Markov, 2010) is the parallelism observed before any
major evolutionary advance. In MWI picture this may be explained as a
collecting of improbable mutations in the Everett worlds selected by AP with
the subsequent horizontal exchange of genes leading to the new evolutionary
step.
It is interesting that MWI allows to describe the famous Gaia Theory
(Lovelock, 2010) in completely Darwinian framework, as the critical remarks
by R. Dawkins (Dawkins, 1982) on the necessity of the existing of multiple
competeng Gaia’s may be indeed realized in parallel Everett worlds and the
selection between them is performed by AP.
We have no opportunity of detailed discussions and just mention that
all these facts may be understood as emerging from improbable rare events
of quantum measurement type, so that all of their outcomes are realized in
parallel worlds. We are just lucky inhabitants of one of the most “pleasant”
of them.
Let us stress, however, that we consider the subject of this section as a
more contradictory and problematic than that of previous one. At the same
time, its further investigation may open the striking opportunities to study
MWI and, hopefully, even to falsify it.
8 Quantum Theory and Consciousness
The problem of possible interrelations between the consciousness and quan-
tum mechanics has been attracting attention of researchers since the dawn
of quantum mechanics. We would like to emphasize that this problem has
three aspects. First, does quantum theory help to explain the origin of the
consciousness ? Second, is the quantum theory necessary for the very ex-
istence of the consciousness ? Third, is the consciousness necessary for the
very existence of quantum theory ?
It seems to us that the ideas presented in the preceding sections answer,
in a way, the first question. The combination of the many-worlds interpre-
tation of quantum theory with the anthropic principle allows to explain the
biological evolution and its top result - the appearance of Human Mind.
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As far as the second question is concerned we inclined to think that the
answer might be positive as well. Indeed, let us suppose that the world is
described exclusively by the classical mechanics, and, hence, the “Laplace
demon” does exist. Namely, fixing exactly the coordinates and velocities
of all the particles in the Universe, it is possible, in principle, to forecast
its future evolution in all the tiny details. Thus, all the complexity of the
universe is already contained in its initial state. How is it possible to pre-
pare such a state? Perhaps, the answer could be only highly teleological.
In the framework of the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics,
the possibility of the co-existence of different alternatives, or Everett worlds,
makes quite natural the fact that between this huge set of worlds does exist
some small fraction of worlds, where the complex structures, including the
Life and the Mind are present.
That the consciousness cannot emerge as a result of a “classical” com-
puter operation, may be intitively seen by the observing of its mechanical
version designed by Babbage and realized in London Museum of Science.
The third question, if the consciousness is necessary to make the quantum
mechanics self-consistent and to describe the process of quantum measure-
ment, was discussed in the framework of the Copenhagen interpretation, in
particular, by von Neumann in his book (von Neumann, 1955). As we have
already mentioned, in the quantum measurement according to von Neu-
mann, three actors played: the quantum object, the measuring device and
the observer. This observer should have possessed the consciousness, oth-
erwise the reduction cannot be completed. Here, it is necessary to mention
that the description of this point given by von Neumann was a somewhat
vague. He said that the borderlines between these three substances are not
well defined, but only the fact of their existence is essential.
Another proponent of the Copenhagen interpretation, Niels Bohr, did
not emphasize the role of consciousness in the process of quantum mea-
surement and limited itself by using the notion of classical realm. On the
other hand, Bohr used to trace the analogies between the complementarity
in quantum physics and that in biology and psychology, and even found
something similar to the indeterminacy principle in the description of the
process of thinking (Bohr, 1958). Thus, on the very qualitative level, Bohr
speculated about the quantum nature of Life and Mind. Generally speaking,
one can say that his answer on the second question was positive, but he did
not insist on answering the third question.
The creation of the many-worlds interpretation by Everett, was moti-
vated by the desire to treat the quantum mechanics without using the clas-
sical realm or the preferred role of a conscious observer. All the quantum
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subsystems, participating in quantum interactions, including measurements
and observations were treated on equal footing. It is known also that Everett
has dedicated essential efforts working in the development of an artificial in-
tellect concepts (Byrne, 2010). Thus, one can believe that in a way he
considered the human brain as a some kind of computer, which certainly,
was governed by the laws of quantum mechanics, but was not an essential
ingredient for its foundations.
An interesting attempt of the combined answer on the second and third
questions, formulated above, was undertaken by M.B. Mensky, who has
elaborated the Extended Everett Concept (EEC) (Mensky, 2007a; Mensky,
2007b; Mensky, 2010; Mensky, 2011). He has stated that both questions
should be answered positively. The consciousness cannot exist without the
quantum theory, but the quantum theory cannot exist without the con-
sciousness as well. The author of the (EEC) notices that the Everett inter-
pretations looks complicated and not logical from the classical point of view,
while it is very simple from the quantum point of view. Indeed, one has only
one fundamental process instead of two. However, the real difficulty arises
when we speak about the separation of the alternatives. On the other hand
nobody really knows what is the consciousness. Thus, Mensky proposes to
resolve the problem of the absence of a good definition of these two phe-
nomena by the identification between the consciousness and the splitting
of classical realities. Thus, the emergence of parallel Everett worlds is an
objective process (like the operation of particle detector at LHC) and con-
sciousness is exactly what is responsible for the splitting of classical realities
(when experimentalists sees only one of the possible outcomes of particles
interactions).
Coming back to the evolution, this splitting may be considered as a first
major evolutionary advance, as it is hardly possible to imagine the living
creature operating simultaneously in the parallel worlds.
However, the possibility of reaching of the parallel Everett branches do
exist and can be realized in such particular states of consciousness as sleep
or trance. The telepathy and other parapsychological effects can also find
its explanation in the frame of the Extended Everett Concept. Besides,
the consciousness can influence the quantum probabilities, augmenting the
chances of realization of some events.
Let us notice, that the idea that telepathy, telekinesis and other paranor-
mal phenomena are in some way connected with the non-classical quantum-
mechanical nature of our world has a relatively long history. A well-known
writer and thinker Arthur Koestler was a proponent of this idea and de-
voted to it some papers and books, between each the most significant is
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“The Roots of Coincidence” (Koestler, 1972). More recently, a Nobel Prize
winner in physics B.D. Josephson has become an active supporter of this
idea (Josephson and Pallikari-Viras, 1991). One can easy understand how
attractive is this prospective, but to our mind it is better to be more cau-
tious. As far as we know, there are no testable quantum-mechanical models
of some parapsychological effects.
Coming back to the Extended Everett Concept, we can say that the
intention to attract the quantum-mechanical methods to the study of the
consciousness looks quite reasonable, but the indefiniteness of the process
of splitting between alternatives and the absence of the understanding what
the consciousness is, cannot be treated on equal footing. Indeed, as was
explained in the third section of the present paper (see also the papers (Zeh,
1973; Barvinsky and Kamenshchik, 1990; Barvinsky and Kamenshchik,
1995a; Barvinsky and Kamenshchik, 1995b)). Here the subdivision of the
quantum system into subsystems determines the preferred bi-orthogonal ba-
sis, whose elements are identified with different Everett worlds. These states
are orthogonal according to their construction and there is no way in which
the consciousness or some other agent can provide jumps between different
branches or to influence the probabilities of different outcomes of experi-
ments. On the other hand, the notion of the consciousness seems to us
much more complicated than the definition of branches or Everett worlds
(it is valid also for simplest forms of consciousness which could be identified
with perception). Thus, the mutual definition of the consciousness and of
the world splitting through their identification does not look plausible.
All said above does not mean that the study of the interrelations between
the quantum physics and the brain sciences is useless. Vice versa, we believe
that one can expect a new and an unpredictable development of the brain
sciences, when the quantum informatics would meet the physiology of brain,
combined with some researches in the empirical psychology. However, it is
difficult to foresee now what concrete from of interaction between sciences
will bring us to success.
9 Are Small Probabilities Irrelevant ?
As is well known one of the main features of quantum mechanics is the
probabilistic character of its predictions. During many years the Born rule,
connecting the probabilities of the outcomes of a quantum measurement
with the squared modules of the coefficients of the expansion of the wave
function of a system under consideration with respect to the eigenvectors of
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the operator, representing the measured quantity, was considered as a fun-
damental postulate. However, later the so called Finkelstein-Hartle-Graham
theorem was proven (Finkelstein, 1963; Hartle, 1968; Graham, 1973). The
message of this theorem consists in the fact that the Born rule can be de-
rived from other postulates of quantum mechanics if one considers a huge
number of identical quantum systems and defines the probability as a rel-
ative frequency of a chosen outcome of an experiment with respect to the
general number of trials. Finkelstein and Hartle considered this statement
without connection with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum me-
chanics, while Graham worked in the framework of this interpretation. It
seems to us that the Finkelstein-Hartle-Graham theorem looks especially
harmonically in the framework of the many-worlds interpretation. Thus, for
the convenience of the reader we shall present here a short demonstration
of this theorem.
Let us consider an experiment undertaken on N identical quantum sys-
tems. Suppose that M different outcomes of the measurement are possible.
If kth outcome appearsmk times, then the relative frequency of this outcome
is equal to mk
N
; naturally,
∑M
k=1mk = N .
The probability of kth outcome can be measured as
lim
N→∞
mk
N
. (14)
Commenting Eq. (14) we have used the term “measured” instead of “de-
fined” . The point is that the term “defined” sometimes is used in the sense
that the very notion of probability is identical to the notion of relative fre-
quency and does not have another sense (von Mises, 1964). We postpone
a little bit the discussion of this question and shall limit ourselves by the
remark that the formula (14) gives an operational method of calculation of
the probability.
Let us consider a quantum system, described by the wave function
|Ψ〉 =
M∑
i=1
Ci|ψi〉, (15)
where |ψi〉 are the eigenstates of the operator Aˆ, corresponding to its eigen-
values Ai. Let us consider now a set of N identical systems, described by
the wave function |Ψ〉. Such a set is described by the wave function
|Ψ〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Ψ〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
. (16)
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Now we introduce the operator of the relative frequency Fˆ kN , indicating
the relative frequency for the outcome Ak in the series of N experiments.
Then
Fˆ kN |ψ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψ1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1 times
· · · |ψk〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψ1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
mk times
· · · |ψM 〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψM 〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM times
=
mk
N
|ψ1〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψ1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
m1 times
· · · |ψk〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψ1〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
mk times
· · · |ψM 〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψM 〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
mM times
,(17)
where
∑M
i=1 = N .
Now, we should prove that at N → ∞ the relative frequency of the
outcome Ak tends to |Ck|
2 = pk. To do it let us consider the vector
(Fˆ kN − pk) |Ψ〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Ψ〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
(18)
and show that its norm tends to zero at N → ∞. Then, the positivity of
the scalar product on the Hilbert space implies the tending of the vector
(18) to zero. Thus, in the limit N → ∞ the wave function (16) becomes
the eigenfunction of the operator of relative frequency with the eigenvalue
pk = |Ck|
2.
Now, substituting (15) into (18), we can write down the squared norm
of the latter:
〈Ψ| ⊗ · · · ⊗ 〈Ψ|︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
(Fˆ kN − pk)
2 |Ψ〉 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Ψ〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
N times
=
N∑
mj=0∑M
j=1 mj=N
|C1|
2m1 · · · |Ck|
2mk · · · |CM |
2mM
m2k
N2
N !
m1! · · ·mM !
−2pk
N∑
mj=0∑M
j=1 mj=N
|C1|
2m1 · · · |Ck|
2mk · · · |CM |
2mM
mk
N
N !
m1! · · ·mM !
+ p2k
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=N∑
mk=0
m2k
N2
N !
mk!(N −mk)!
N∑
mj=1∑M
j=1
j 6=k
mj=N−mk
(N −mk)!
m1! · · ·mM !
|C1|
2m1 · · · |CM |
2mM + p2k
=
N∑
mk=0
(
m2k
N2
pmk (1− pk)
N−mk
N !
mk!(N −mk)!
−
2mk
N
p
mk+1
k (1− pk)
N−mk
N !
mk!(N −mk)!
)
+p2k = p
2
k
(
N − 1
N
+
1
Npk
− 2 + 1
)
=
pk(1− pk)
N
. (19)
When N →∞ the expression (19) tends to zero and the theorem is proven.
Thus, the Born rule can be derived from the consideration of the wave
function of the system, including an infinite (in the limit) number of identical
subsystems. The probability is in a natural way connected with the scalar
product on the Hilbert space.
However, in the treatment of the notion of probablity in the frame of
the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics some problems arise.
One of them can be called the problem of two measures. As was noticed by
Graham (1973) in the many-worlds interpreation another measure can be
introduced. This measure is connected with a naive counting of the Everett
worlds in which different outcomes of an experiment are realized. From the
point of view of usual quantum-mechanical measure these worlds do not
have the same value because to any of them corresponds some probability
pi = |Ci|
2.
However, one can think in another way (Graham, 1973). One can say
that from the point of view of the many-worlds interpretation all these worlds
are equally real and we cannot prescribe some weights to them. If we would
like to know the probability of a certain concrete event, we should consider
the set of all Everett worlds and then to learn in which part of them the
given event occurs. Thus, the new “naive” probability can be defined as
p˜ =
m
N
, (20)
where N is a full number of the Everett worlds and m is number of the
worlds where the event which we are interested in occurs. Obviously, the
probabilities defined in (20) can differ essentially from the usual quantum-
mechanical probabilities.
To make the conception more clear, let us consider an example. We have
an object described by the wave function
|Ψ〉 = C1|Ψ1〉+ C2|Ψ2〉. (21)
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Let us immagine an experiment with two outcomes correposnding to the
functions |Ψ1〉 and |Ψ2〉 with the probablities p = |C1|
2 and 1 − p = |C2|
2.
Having done the experiment on the 10 identical systems, we shall see that
the wavefunction describing these ensemble toghether with an observer will
be splitted into 210 = 1024 branches. Let us calculate now the probability
of getting of the same result corresponding to the wave function |Ψ1〉 in all
10 experiments. Obviously this occurs only in one world. According to the
Graham definition(20) we have the probablity of such an event equal to 2−10
while according to the standard Born rule the probability is equal to p10 and
can be quite big if p is close to 1. Continuing the comparison between these
two measures, one can see that the most probable from the Born point of
view distribution of outcomes (approximately in 10p cases the first outcome
and in 10(1 − p) cases the second outcome) will be realized only in a small
part of 1024 Everett worlds. In the majority of worlds one shall see 5 first
outcomes and 5 second outcomes.
In other words, only in a small subset of the Everett worlds the usual
predictions of the quantum mechanics will be confirmed. However, if we take
into account the weights of these branches according to the Born rule, then
the weighted part of the worlds, where the quantum mechanical predictions
are false, will be very small, because such worlds enter into the expansion
of the wave function with very small coefficients.
Thus, we have seen the contradictions between two measures, but which
of them is true ? The quantum mechanical measure is supported by the
mathematical apparat of quantum mechanics, including the Finkelstein-
Hartle-Graham theorem and by the experimental data. The naive measure
is connected with the idea of the equally real parallel Everett worlds. If the
quantum mechanical measure is true and the naive probablity does not have
sense, does not it compromize the many-worlds interpretation?
Curious, while to our mind wrong, attempt of resolution of this contra-
diction was undertaken by Graham (1973). His approach was critisized in
the book (Barvinsky, Kamenshchik and Ponomariov, 1988) and our exposi-
tion follows here to that represented in this book. Graham considered the
naive probablity as a fundamental one, and using thermodynamical meth-
ods, has tried to reduce the quantum mechanical measure to the naive one.
The Graham’s logic was the following one: the quantum measurement is
done by a macroscopic device, thus it includes such a stage as a transi-
tion of the disturbed device into a state of thermal equilibrium. To the
macrostate of the device corresponds a whole subspace in the Hilbert space
of states and one can think that all the microstates corresponding to a given
macrostate have the same weight. Starting from these correct statements
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Graham suggested that the process of the transition of the device to the
thermal equilibrium is combined with the process of some kind of statistical
smoothing of the wave function of the quantum object. To describe this pro-
cess Graham has undertaken the averaging of the wave function of the object
under consideration on all the Hilbert space. Then one can find the average
values of the squared modules of the coefficients of the expansion of the
wave function of the object on the basis, including the states corresponding
to the definite outcomes of the experiment. These average values are equal
to N−1, where N is the number of possible outcomes of the experiment (for
details see (Graham, 1973) and (Barvinsky, Kamenshchik and Ponomariov,
1988)). Having done these direct calculations, Graham has concluded that
using the thermodynamical notions he had managed to reduce the quantum
mechanical measure to the naive one.
However, in this averaging the principal error is hidden. This procedure
eliminates all the quantum information, encoded in the coefficients of the
expansion of the wave function. Thus, this procedure is equivalent to the
obviously wrong hypothesis that all the coefficients of the expansion are
equal.
We have discussed this attempt of the reducing of the Born probabil-
ity to the naive probability to show that the difference between them are
fundamental and one of them cannot be reduced to another. Then, what
is the sense of the probability in the many-worlds interpretation when all
the outcomes are realized ? From our point of view, the natural way of in-
terpretation of the probability in quantum mechanics in general and in the
many-worlds interpretation, in particular, is the acception of the Popper’s
conception of the probability as a “propensity” (Popper, 1959).
Probably, the most known interpretation of the notion of probablity (at
least, between physicists) is relative-frequency interpretation, elaborated by
von Mises (von Mises, 1964). According to this interpretation the relative
frequency measurement is not only the empirical method of the calculation
of the probability, but the definition of the very notion of the probability.
Thus, the probability is applicable only to the study of series of trials or
of ensembles of identical objects and is not applicable to individual events
and objects. At the same time, the probablistic character of the physical
laws is fundamental according to von Mises. The applicability of the Mises
approach to the statistical elboration of data or to the classical statistical
physics does not provoke doubts. The relative-frequency conception of the
probability enters naturally into the statistical interpretation of quantum
mechanics, which rejects the applicability of the quantum mechanics to in-
dividual systems, limiting itself by consideration of ensembles (see e.g. the
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book (Blokhintsev, 2010)). However, already the Copenhagen interpretation
considers individual objects and hence, here the probablities are not subject
to the relative-frequency treatment. Analysing this problem Popper has sug-
gested the conception of the probablity as a propensity (Popper, 1959). He
considered the probability as a property of the event by itself and not as a
characteristic of a succession of events or of an ensemble of objects. One can
say that the probability treated as a propensity is a quantitative measure of
tendencies, which an object under consideration possesses. The propensitive
interpretation of the probability gives us an opportunity to speak about the
probability of an individual event, Thus, we can apply quantum mechanics
to individual objects being free of rather narrow frames of the statistical
interpretation.
The probability as a propensity becomes especially attractive when we
combine it with the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. In-
deed, the probability coefficients, describing the different branches of the
wave function, characterize the propensities of an observer to come to one
of the parallel Everett worlds, while the relative-frequency interpretation
of the probability is hardly acceptable in this context. Indeed, the act of
branching, or the defactorization of the wave function is unique and one can-
not consider a statistical ensemble of identical universes, in each of which
the branching takes place.
Now, let us note that when one speaks about the universe as a whole,
combining the many-worlds interpretation with the anthropic principle, even
the propensity interpretation of the probability has a relative value. Rather
often, the reaserchers trying to explain why, for example, a cosmological con-
stant or other important characteristics of the universe have values favorable
for the appearance of the Life and of the Mind, make some estimations of
the probabilistic distributions for these characteristics. From our point of
veiw it hardly can have some sense. The branches of the wave function of
the universe, where these favorable values are realised have a very small
probability weights. It is not important. It is important that such branches
do exist ! Thus, at least, in a small part of the Hilbert space some interest-
ing development is possible. Once again, the comparison between small and
large probabilities makes sense when operates with large numbers of iden-
tical systems or with the large number of identical experiments. When one
thinks about unique events in the history of the universe, the real difference
is between possible and impossible, in principle.
It is interesting to note that the understanding of the fact that the events
which have very small probability can represent an especial interest was re-
cently developed in the field, which looks to be non connected with physics,
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namely in the social life, including its political and economical aspects. We
mean here the bestselling book “The Black Swan” by N.N. Taleb, a modern
expert in finances and statistics and a philosopher (Taleb, 2007). The main
topic of the book is the analysis of the role of events which looks extremely
improbable and unpredictable, which the author calls “black swans”. Para-
doxically, these events rather often appear to be the most significant for the
future development of the Humankind. The appearance of such events and
their influence is typical for very complicated systems.
Another interesting observation concerning the qualitative importance
of quantitatively small objects one can find in the article “The Birth of the
Freedom”, written by a Russian philosopher Georgy Fedotov as early as in
1944 (Fedotov, 1944). The translation of some extractions from this text is
worth of citing.
“The puzzle of the importance of small magnitudes remains unsolved:
why almost all which has a great value occurs at the materially small scales?
. . .We should upside down all the scales of estimations and take into account
as an initial point not the quantities, but the qualities.. . . The freedom shares
the destiny of all elevated and valuable in the world. A small, politically
fragmented Greece has given to the world the science, has given the forms
of the thought and of the artistic perception which until now determine the
world view of hundreds of millions of persons. Even more tiny Judea has
given to the world the greatest religion, which is professed by people of all the
continents. The small island behind La Manche has elaborated the system
of political organization, which being less universal than the Christianity
and science, reigns, nevertheless in three continents.”
Coming back to the physics, we can say that the most important branches
of the universe, or the most interesting Everett worlds can have a very small
probabilistic weight. Thus, like in the Taleb’s statements that the most im-
portant events are unpredictable from the usual probabilistic point of view,
or in the Fedotov’s observation that the most important developments in the
history of the Humankind were realized in small geographical and politically
weak areas, we can say that the most interesting things in the universe occur
in a tiny part of the Hilbert space, where the wave function of the universe
lives.
10 Discussion and Conclusions
In this article we have tried to explore the possible relation between An-
thropic Principle and Many-World Interpretation of Quantum Theory. The
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key moment is the possibility to multiply the reality to such an extent that
very special events like emergence of Life become quite possible.
The important feature of this process is the smallness of differences be-
tween various parallel Everett worlds. This allows to scan all the possible
values of required parameters which is essentially similar to the arguments
justifying Darwinian natural selection. The only, albeit crucial difference is
that selection occurs not in the different moments of time like Darwinian
one, but in the different parallel worlds, or, mathematically speaking, in the
different regions of Hilbert space. Such a resemblance to the Darwinian evo-
lution may be explored for other known mechanisms of generation of variety
of options (like string landscape or eternal chaotic inflation) in order to sepa-
rate the ”physical” predictions from the effects of “environment” (Rubakov,
2006) or “scanning” (Weinberg, 2005) which we are about to suggest.
Indeed, if some physical constant should be fine-tuned for the emergence
of life it is very unlikely that it is completely defined by underlying physics
(cf. (Smolin, 1998)) and selection process of Darwinian type was likely to
contribute. At the same time, the physics should rather lead to the estab-
lishing of general framework and more robust constraints (see, for example,
(Barvinsky and Kamenshchik, 2006a; Barvinsky and Kamenshchik, 2006b),
where in the framework of the Euclidean quantum gravity some constraints
on possible values of the effective cosmological constant were found) which
may be a starting point for subsequent fine-tuning by anthropic selection.
In the case of the Many-Worlds Interpretation such a selection allows to
fine-tune various parameters which are not amongst the basic constants of
theory of fundamental interactions, including gravity and elementary par-
ticle physics. This is because the branching due to the Many-Worlds in-
terpretation occurs when all the fundamental constants are already fixed
and therefore they are the same in all the Everett parallel worlds. We sug-
gested to use the term “Mesoscopic Anthropic Principle” for the description
of anthropic selection in the branching process.
We considered two possible fields of applicability of Mesoscopic An-
thropic Principle, namely, planetary coincidences and biological evolution.
In both cases the small differences generated by branching allow to ex-
plain the coincidences which is very difficult to do otherwise. As an example
we consider the coincidence of angular sizes of Sun and Moon responsible
for the Solar eclipses. This coincidence may be achieved by small steps dur-
ing branching, and anthropic selection may choose it to be realized in our
Universe if eclipses played any role in the life emergence. This hypothesis
may be checked , in principle, opening an opportunity for indirect tests of
Anthropic Principle.
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The other important problem is the arising of complexity during bilogical
evolution, including such extreme cases as Life itself and Mind. We suggest
that crucial role is played the Many-Worlds interpretation, so that extremely
small probability is fully compensated by enormous number of trials.
Summing up, we consider the Anthropic Principle combined with the
multiple opportunities opened also by the Many-Worlds interpretation of
quantum theory, as new exciting field of physics and other natural sciences,
rather than dull alternative to them.
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